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Abstract 
The history of Europe in recent decades, in particular as regards the information and 
communication strategies of the European institutions for the Europeans in general, has 
been the story of a misconception that has greatly penalized the consolidation of the 
European project. This means that if, on the one hand, the European institutions have 
generally sought to promote and disseminate an idea of progress for Europe, their public 
media, including broadcasting media, which are heavily funded by the budgets of the 
Member States, collapse in general. In fact, this results from the subservience of public 
broadcasting media in general to the dictatorship of the audiences and market 
strategies, with the ‘agrément’ of the European Commission itself, contributing not to the 
affirmation of the Idea of Europe, but to its destruction and the emergence of times of 
political regression such as we are experiencing at this end of the second decade of the 
century. 
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"The sofa is up against the door, she's not leaving" 
Iain Duncan Smith 
Tory MP (22/5/2019) 
 
The quote above from Brexiter Duncan Smith refers to the crisis arising from the 
resignation of British Prime Minister Theresa May on the eve of the European 
Parliament elections in the United Kingdom on 23 May 2019. The perfectly 
surreal nature of the current situation and of this quote are perturbing enough in 
themselves. Not only do they reflect the degradation of politics in Great Britain 
and the European Union, but they portray a schizophrenic image of Brexit itself. 
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They achieve this by way of a mordant satire of contemporary politics in real 
time, at a time when comedy is rapidly transforming into tragedy and into 
something that portends to be fatal to the European project. 
It has long been foretold that the idea of a great European house has been 
slowly wafting away as the international order in consequence risks collapse. If 
we wanted to explain to an alien recently arrived on Earth, we could do so in a 
simplified manner, with two or three questions and one answer: What has led to 
the strong resurgence of the far right in Europe in recent years? Who supported 
the war in Iraq and triggered Islamic radicalism and the appearance of Daesh? 
Who mortgaged the concept of Europe and the European cultural identity? Who 
has been leading the European project in recent decades in its descent into 
caricature? There is a common denominator in these questions: The European 
Union. 
Which leads us to a true paradox. Being pro-European today most likely means 
pulling support away from those who, while professing to hold the same 
position, have been spending the whole of recent decades governing Europe and 
simultaneously stifling it and even silently digging its grave. In Europe, today, 
particularly but not exclusively in the countries of the south, a serious 
democratic crisis took place during the years of economic crisis. Distrust in 
institutions has risen sharply as have negative opinions on the part of citizens of 
the democratic, social and political experience in the post-crisis period of 2007-
2008 (Fernandes, 2019). 
Might the only option for these European citizens be to opt for an active non-
alignment intended to help save this European project from rigor mortis? Or is it 
already too late? Today we are witnessing the disintegration into new 
"superdiversities" and a potential interculturalism which are turning us into a 
community of strangers, even zombies, both European and non-European. The 
streets of Europe have been abandoned and the "community of destinies", 
solidarity and cohesive belonging have been deregulated (Giddens, 2014:8). All 
of this has led us to a sort of dead end whose final wall carries a plaque reading 
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"RIP EU". António Barreto's description (2019) of Europe as a "construction of 
nothing" seems to make sense to me. 
For Barreto, in this strange community, the emergence of the new despotisms, 
"of irrational and nationalistic populism" is clearly seen: "Both will be able to 
demolish the Union and destroy freedom." Today, critics of this Europe without 
an idea, with neither head nor legitimacy, far surpass that predicted by George 
Steiner in 2004, in his essential reflection - The Idea of Europe. The future had 
been delineated: Europe has traded in its values and even worse, its cultural 
heritage, to the "despotism of the mass market and marketed stardom" 
(Steiner, 2005: 54). All we receive in return is the mere threat of the continual 
"weariness" that Edmund Husserl warned us that European man was subject to. 
The irony of the current situation, as Jan Zielonka (2018) pointed out, is that 
"those who have led to the chaos are being tasked with restoring order." 
 
Fatigue 
In fact, within recent decades, the West and Europe have allowed a political and 
social paradigm to arise that is equivalent to a kind of neural pathology: a 
society of fatigue (Han, 2010). Society is suffering from extreme levels of 
attention deficit regarding what is taking place. We have collective amnesia. We 
are depressed, made up of a community of strangers who are either engaged in 
mobbing, or are burnt out, who can no longer tell memory from forgetfulness, 
and cannot even recognize their own cultural heritage. In short, Europe tripped 
up at a crossroads, perhaps running the risk of engaging in assisted suicide 
without even realizing it. 
Within the throes of death, something still stirs. The Other (the immigrant or the 
refugee) has ceased to be the stranger. Otherness is now seen, rather, as just 
different, more as "a burden to society than as a threat" (Han, 2010: 12). This 
late-modern, post-disciplinary contemporary society, anchored in production, 
work, and hysteria, has created its monsters, who live the paradoxical freedom 
of being recognised for their contributions to production, but that, in practice, 
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turn the individual into a productive subject, into a depressed and violent 
person, an animal laborans, an "exhausted soul" (Han, 2010: 21). The new 
economies of attention – ranging from media and political pollution to the 
toxicity of social networks, in addition to all the related multitasking, are nothing 
more than a regression based on hyperattention that bewilders and distracts, 
nothing but a fateful hyperactivity / passivity. In this context, time, the vita 
contemplativa, resonance, reciprocity, serenity, are the elements of 
deceleration, only they can avoid "the depressive fatigue of the Self" (Han, 
2010: 47), its acceleration, or the "alienating fatigue" and the exhaustion of the 
system. 
Kukutani (2018) cited Hannah Arendt and her work Origins of Totalitarianism, in 
regards to the resurgence of the beast in the monster's belly, the womb of the 
so-called western democracies, which had earlier been identified by Arendt when 
looking at the crisis of citizens' rights and by extension at the very concept of 
the late nineteenth century nation-state. From that point to the restriction of 
freedom, rights and pluralism, to the imposition of propaganda and bureaucracy 
as a form of domination, where administration gradually replaces or limits in a 
prophetic fashion the power and legitimacy of the executive, is one small step.  
Now is the time, above all, to reflect deeply and seriously, to think in an 
unfettered manner, without fear or preconception, about what is at the origin, 
where the monster is truly born, where it is recycled and reborn. This place is 
the state of deregulation, of iniquity, of the spread of corruption and of special 
interests, of corrupted information and data, of the kidnapping of the field of 
mediation and of the media, in short, the field of the failed democracies, the 
belly where the beast reproduces once again. 
This cyclical rebirth of the monster, and the potential horror associated with it, 
takes place when the populist fiction overrides the precarious (dis)equilibrium of 
Western democracies. It comes about in a well-publicized fashion and lending a 
certain amount of legitimation to proto-totalitarian political models that are 
continually rising up throughout the world. It invokes narratives that are 
unrecognizable by civil experience, yet are propagated by the media and now, 
especially, by social networks, and which are dragging societies back to the 
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unpredictable. Among the various causes contributing to this reversal are, in 
particular, a progressive weakening of the media as the traditional guardians of 
information, the marked diminishment and precariousness in the field of 
journalism along with the rise of the algorithmic model of gatekeeping, the 
associated phenomena of polarization and political regression, as well as the 
yielding of civil virtue to fatigue. 
There is no doubt that democratic fatigue (Appadurai, 2017) has taken root. The 
question that arises, at a certain moment, especially in the post war period, 
which is considered to be the media era par excellence: Has there ever been 
democracy without fatigue, democracy with a capital D, with full civil virtue and 
full citizen participation, with full transparency and scrutiny of public affairs and 
of the Res publica, within a state built on the model of parliamentary democratic 
representation? For example, when we look at the history of the relationship 
between the media and democracy in recent decades in the West, the balance is 
critical. In Portugal, we need only retreat back to the period immediately 
following the 25th of April and the heated summer that followed. The media at 
that time had clearly been hijacked by partisan politics and from that moment 
forward, nothing extraordinary or radically different might have taken place had 
it not been for the spread of those groups who hijacked to new, national and 
foreign interests, economic powers, etc. 
The democratic experience, as we know it, generally includes within its own 
genesis, construction and development, its own corruption, its self-degradation, 
and its own fatigue. This happens, first of all, as a result of mechanisms 
inhibiting self-evaluation and external scrutiny, while they also restrict 
transparency. Then, for this reason, it pulls into itself, phenomena of occult 
powers, of traffic of influence, partisan cronyism, political and economic 
patronage, corruption, in short, the slow, cyclical and continuous corrosion and 
decrepitude of the democratic system. 
And all has become even more complex in the age of the networks. In her article 
"Hell after Paradise", Zeynep Tufekci (2018), based on her investigation into the 
entanglements between big data and social media from the political and 
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sociological points of view, posed the key issue in a preliminary fashion. In a 
short space of time, between the so-called Arab Spring and the arrival on stage 
of Cambridge Analytica, we have switched from an age of hope for social 
networks and for political change that might deepen the experience of 
citizenship and we have been forced to recognise multiple cases of the 
subversion of the very principles of democracy. 
The famous cover of the MIT Technology Review of January 2013 following 
Obama's 2012 second election announced, "Big Data Will Save Politics". Yet it 
was already definitely outdated by the same strategies of microtargeting that 
the same candidate had used in 2008 and 2012. Tufecki argued that the new 
technological and political experiment was, however, to become a "fatal 
combination" for dictators as well. They redefined options that now surpassed 
the level of proto-deliberativism to achieve a state of post-truth, dedicated to 
the tracking of vulnerabilities, polarization, and the disinformation of voters. She 
posits that there are several causes for this reversal, namely: i) the "weakening" 
of the media as traditional guardians of information; ii) the clickbait era of the 
new gatekeepers; iii) the enervation of local journalism; iv) the phenomenon of 
polarization and echo chambers; and, v) the exploitation of "weak digital 
security in the U.S". In her words, "It was not Russia that created conditions for 
social mistrust, weak institutions and distant elites ..." (Tufecki, 2018: 48). And 
she listed the main mistakes of the U.S.: the Iraq War, the 2008 financial 
collapse, health system and insurance, responses to the climate crisis, 
Congressional lobbying, tax havens, and the fragility of internet anti-trust 
measures, etc.  Another issue might be worth adding: Facebook's mission to 
make the world more open and connected, yet more dependent on the 
platform's most important asset, the resale of users' attention (and private 
data). 
 
Regression 
From the paradox between the acceleration of technology and the regression of 
both politics and the democratic experience, a new "disinformative" order is 
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arising together with the complex phenomenon of polarization which has been 
created by counterintelligence centres with the intermediation of the so-called 
"alternative media" (Horaczek, 2019) of the far right. Great digital platforms 
have arrived as well. They were introduced into Western politics at the beginning 
of the new century and have gone on to dissuade debate and freedom of 
information, to restrict and fence in critical public spheres, and repress any hint 
of civil virtue or diversity of cultural expression. Thus, in addition to the model of 
reciprocity and to the forms of relationship that provoke a resonant response, we 
are now witnessing most of all empty, or mute forms of relationship or those 
that only reinforce people's current convictions. 
Hartmut Rosa (2010) pointed out that the acceleration of time and technology, 
the control of the virtual and the new systems of mediation, contain in 
themselves the embryos of a new form of totalitarian domination by way of the 
web they weave. They recenter the post-modern condition exactly around a new 
"nature" based on data bases (Lyotard, 1979), social acceleration, models of 
inequality and uncertainty (Innerarity, 2018), and regression, all of which may 
lead to "democracy fatigue" (Appadurai, 2017). All this takes place amid the late 
capitalism of globalization, in which culture is diluted by economics. The 
"disintegration of the social" takes place along with the unregulated acceleration 
of technology. The association between the creation of wealth and the growth of 
inequality can also be seen as a consequence of asymmetric and deregulated 
technological development. 
On the other hand, classical models of pluralism and of contradiction in the 
media are now at a new crossroads. The new situations of the rise of the far 
right-wing media seek to recenter processes and to lead to new principles of 
exclusion, new strategies for conquering ethno-national sovereignty by 
smothering intellectual and cultural dissidence. With the populist reversal, the 
Other is rejected, and this syndrome of democratic fatigue is imposed in a 
context sometimes referred to as "post-democratic" (Appadurai, 2017). 
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Mediarchy 
It is patently obvious that the fields of communications – media, news media, 
and advertising – have become superimposed within in this complex global 
crisis. Alternative facts and fake news have added a new ideology –  that of 
clickbait – and its replicants: bots, chatbots, and all the troll factories in the 
world that use Twitter and Facebook as surrogate mothers, such as terrorist 
platforms, political mafias and cyberwarriors, which make use of strategies to 
attract attention and destabilize geopolitics. Those who make use of clickbait 
have no concern for either content or ethics. What matters to them is to 
maximize the quantitative effect of this unscrupulous click economy. 
Against all expectations, fifty years after the creation of the Internet, politics and 
fraud have rediscovered each other in more highly complex technological 
environments supported by sophisticated algorithmic models and Artificial 
Intelligence. They are colliding with classical democratic values, in particular with 
the transparency of democracy, freedom of expression and information, and 
pluralism. Hence, the fears of the critics of technological acceleration – from 
Orwell (1949) to Mumford (1963), from Ellul (1964) to Rosa (2010) – and their 
warnings about the potential emergence of technological tyranny over humanity 
are perhaps more current than ever before. 
Stiegler (2011), for example, taught us that mass culture is mainly at the 
service of capturing and destroying attention. It seeks to disseminate the 
everyday censorship of the plurality of voices and cultural expressions. It serves 
as a regime designed to deter communication and normalize consensus by way 
of a "mediarchy" (Citton, 2017) intended to maintain a permanent state of 
denial and manipulation of information. It was the model of manufacturing 
consent that was dependent on dominant interest groups, and it led to the 
degradation of the democratic experience and evolved into our recent examples 
of political polarization and proto-fascist populisms now in the midst of our 
digital age. 
The concept of "mediarchy", was proposed by Yves Citton. He argued that the 
performative power of the media prevails over democracy. It encompasses the 
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models of perception of the world included within these systems of mediation 
and the accumulation of power and capacities to act. Moreover, it also 
reconfigures the specific structure of the media in a prescriptive dimension of 
this performative device that controls expression and representations of the 
world. The media, thereby, shapes our view of facts and events and conditions 
our perceptions and behavior. Today's mediated conditioning has reached a 
worrisome dimension, especially in the digital sphere, with its so-called filter 
bubbles, the echo chambers that have created the greatest phenomena of 
political polarization in history. 
This is how the risk that the media might evolve into tyranny is coming back 
under debate in the West, along with a reflection on potential new holocausts. 
Take a look at the post-truth question. As Timothy Snyder (2017) rightly pointed 
out, post-truth is largely the announcement of pre-fascism. It is a growing model 
of communication for this digital age that is based on denying both memory and 
the event, in favor of false narratives constructed and disseminated 
automatically by the new populisms, in order to denigrate facts, political 
opponents, or history itself. Around the contemporary issue of truth and the 
media, the author focuses on another central theme of his work, that alternative 
facts and the persecution by the populists of both the transparency of 
information and the ethics of journalism together with post-truth "reestablish(es) 
precisely the fascist attitude to the truth "(p. 57). Snyder is also highly critical of 
the system of the media. He argues that the media basically "go along with the 
real events of the present day" (2017: 73), subscribing to a contemporary 
critical lineage – from Steiner to Habermas – that associates the media with the 
democratic crisis. 
In addition to the fatigue of European citizens in relation to the EU bureaucracy, 
as demonstrated both by recent electoral abstention and the fact that the same 
bureaucracy failed to take up identity issues and defend cohesion and European 
cultural heritage, Europe and the European media also failed to deal well with 
the 2015 migrant crisis (Georgiou, 2019). Moreover, they have also failed to 
respond to the trend towards populism, from Orbán to Kaczynski, from Brexit to 
Trump, notwithstanding all the previously mentioned issues (i.e. the invasion of 
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Iraq, the subprime crisis, etc). Hence it has been said that "what fuels populism 
today is a crisis of the traditional media" (Sousa, 2019). 
 
Europe out of the picture 
Gianni Baget Bozzo (1986), a former Italian member of the European Parliament 
and author of one of the first reports on the communications strategy of the EEC 
at that time, pointed out as early as the 1980s that Community initiatives were 
being received by Europeans with indifference and mistrust. He argued that 
European institutions were underestimating the common cultural ties among 
European citizens and suggested as a possible solution that greater reliance be 
placed on the European "message" rather than random news and that the most 
appropriate means of communication should be used (Aldrin and Utard, 2008). 
The essential question, from our point of view, might be that pointed out by 
Valentini and Nesti (2010: 59) who stated that it was decisive that the "ifs" and 
"how" of EU initiatives "take into consideration cultural factors in setting up 
communication strategies that foster dialogue within and outside Member States 
and whether culture can be seen as a vehicle for mutual understanding, trust 
and a common sense of belonging. In this respect, a shared culture could be the 
paradigm that boosts citizens' support for the EU project." 
Perhaps under the influence of Gianni Bozzo, European deputy Francisco Lucas 
Pires (1992) issued a similar opinion shortly thereafter. The former Portuguese 
Member of the European Parliament remarked in his booklet that European 
integration was coming together in the material and moral fields but was far 
from the achieving any unity "in terms of political discourse and the 
multinational dialogue about itself. In regard to journalism, (...) the European 
community is still more news than message (...)". He concluded by pointing out 
that it would be good for the EEC "to have the means and the capacity to start 
by representing itself to itself".1
                                                          
1 Francisco Lucas Pires, A Imprensa e a Europa, Lisbon, 1992, Author’s edition. 
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As European Commissioner for Relations with Parliament, Culture and 
Audiovisual, João de Deus Pinheiro was one of the first European leaders to 
search out solutions, as early as the 1990s, to the EU's crisis of communication 
with its citizens. In response to his proposal, the Commission acknowledged the 
need to remedy the problem "as a matter of utmost urgency" considering that 
"the information deficit is part of the democratic deficit", and taking a position 
regarding its new information and communication policy, identifying the 
following main problems: 
"The weakness of the overall strategy and the lack of coordination; failure 
to appreciate the importance of information and communication policy; 
lack of proper identification of the specific requirements of individual 
audiences; to surfeit of information but of insufficient quality not always 
suited to the needs of the public".2
Subsequently, on several occasions, the European Parliament called on the 
Commission to set up a common strategy for information and communication, by 
way of resolutions on Information and Communication Policy in the European 
Union (14/05/1998) and on the Information and Communication Strategy in the 
European Union (14/03/2001). In mid-2001, the Commission Communication on 
"A new framework for cooperation initiatives in EU information and 
communication policy" was published (CCE, Brussels, 27.6.2001.COM (2001) 
354 final). It set out the main strategic guidelines for EU communications, 
including cooperation between the institutions and the Member States, 
establishing the Commission's Interinstitutional Group for Information and 
Communication Services (Commission and Parliament), arrangements for 
monitoring and assessing impact, and finally the means for providing information 
and communication activities. Television and radio broadcasts and information 
for journalists were highlighted as "one of the priorities of the European 
institutions", in order to inform citizens by audiovisual means. Cooperation with 
Euronews was set up so that various information programmes might be 
produced, and this cooperation was to be renewed for a period of three years. 
Finally, Europe by Satellite (EBS) was to provide live coverage of the institutions' 
 
                                                          
2 See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-93-538_en.htm 
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work and news briefs. This European information and communication policy was 
created in 2002 to "close the gap between the Union and the public ... to create 
a Europe that is close to the people, that is familiar and meaningful to them" 
(COM (2001) 354:3). To some extent the aim was also to facilitate the process 
of building Europe, as was mentioned in a Community guideline that advocated 
the dissemination of information that might be more qualitative and strategic 
than quantitative (COM 281 (2002). 
A crucial new moment for the definition of policies was the Commission's new 
Communication about the implementation of the information and communication 
strategy for the European Union (COM (2004) 196 final). Information and 
communication strategy was meant to refer to the framework for communicating 
with the general public (rather than all the Commission’s information measures), 
as set out in the Commission’s communication of 2 July 2002 
[COM(2002)350 final]. The main objectives of this strategy included improving 
the image of the EU and its institutions, as well as disseminating the knowledge 
and understanding of its missions, and, above all, establishing a dialogue with 
citizens. The fact is that in the Communications of 2001 (354 final) and 2004 
(196 final), the Commission appeared to remain unaware of the existence of a 
public European audiovisual system. This last communique said that (p. 
17):"The great growth in radio and television broadcasting (only EUR 15 there 
were more than 1,100 national television channels and 1,900 local or regional 
ones...makes it more cumbersome to use." Would the Commission consider that 
in order to reach a "large audience" with the "limited resources relative to the 
costs of achieving such goal" would imply "using a critical mass of means aimed 
at multiplier targets". There was no acknowledgement of the existence of the 
highly relevant European public television and radio services, which, curiously, 
have always been side lined relative to European information and communication 
strategies. 
In their 2004 study "In Search of Europe - A Cross-National Comparative Study 
of the European Union in National Television News", Claes H. de Vreese and 
Jochen Peter carried out a cross-national comparative content analysis of the 
coverage of European Union politics in British, Danish, Dutch, French, and 
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German television news. The goal was to establish a baseline for television 
coverage of the EU in a non-event context. In most of the countries studied, EU 
politics were marginally represented on national television news. They found that 
"public broadcasting outlets did not report more frequently about the EU than 
did private outlets. However, the EU was more prominently covered in public 
than in private television. In other words, the visibility of EU affairs was equally 
low in both public television and commercial television, but public outlets 
attributed more importance to EU affairs than did commercial television."(P.16). 
The most significant conclusion, however, was that the Europeanization of 
television news coverage is more illusion than reality. The findings also 
suggested that there is no European public sphere in mainstream television 
coverage. 
A year later (2005), Commission Vice-President Margot Wallström, head of 
Institutional Relations and the Communication Strategy, met European 
broadcasters, asking them to "put Europe in the Picture". Two hundred 
broadcast editors and correspondents from all over Europe gathered in Brussels 
for a two-day consultative conference entitled: Putting Europe in the Picture. At 
that time, this was the main picture, there was limited exposure of the EU in 
bulletins, but with significant differences between European broadcasters: 
“It’s time to get away from the old approach of putting out the same dull 
and uniform messages to everyone in Europe. It’s time to find out what 
people actually need to know, and to start giving them the information 
they need in lively language that makes sense to them, using the media 
they are familiar with. You the broadcasters are crucial to the success of 
this strategy.”3
Wallström proposed regular meetings between the broadcasters and EU 
institutions to assess the changing needs of both sides and to highlight the best 
TV concepts to deal with European affairs. She sought to encourage the 
development of European TV by using attractive formats for putting the message 
across about Union policies. The objective of the conference was to establish 
 
                                                          
3 “Europe in the Picture”, IP/05/461, Brussels, 20 April 2005. 
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how the EU might help broadcasters report European affairs more effectively.4
“What Europeans want is what they get: i) 67% of Europeans want more 
TV information programs about Europe; ii) 77% of Europeans consider TV 
information programs about Europe superficial and of poor quality. What 
do most Europeans expect from TV information programs about Europe? 
They also want to see information that is relevant to their daily lives, put 
into perspective in relation to the broader context. They do not want to 
see politicians' faces...”
 
Some of the conclusions and recommendations of senior broadcasters and online 
editors, participants in the conference held in Brussels (2005) were as follows: 
5
Several years later, the Commission published "A citizens’ summary" (2008)
 
6
To address this deficit, the Commission Vice-President Margot Wallström 
presented an audiovisual action plan, which sought to provide more information 
on European issues to the citizens by way of the audiovisual media. In response 
to the problem, the Commission launched the Communicating Europe through 
Audiovisual Media initiative. Brussels drew up a three-step approach to achieve 
this goal. Firstly, it aimed to contribute to greater and more sustainable 
coverage of EU affairs by providing audiovisual media professionals with quality 
information and material. To that end, the EU information services were to 
 
where they conceded that "One of the factors currently undermining genuine 
citizens' information and debate on the European Union is the very limited 
coverage of EU information in the audiovisual media.  Most Europeans are 
interested in news about the European Union (64% according to the 
Eurobarometer of March 2007). Figures indicated that they would prefer to 
receive this information on their favourite TV and radio channels. However, the 
EU-related information provided by national audiovisual media currently takes up 
less than 10% of the time allocated to national news." 
                                                          
4 It was conducted in collaboration with the main European broadcasting associations, including 
the EBU – European Broadcasting Union. 
5 PUTTING EUROPE IN THE PICTURE. Findings and recommendations of senior broadcasters and 
online editors, participants in the conference held in Brussels on 20-21 April 2005, p. 2. 
http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/pdf/recommendations.pdf 
6 Annex to the Communication to the Commission “Communicating Europe through audiovisual 
media” SEC(2008)506/2, 24.4.2008. 
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increase the coverage of EU affairs to help broadcasters supply more information 
about the EU on European screens and to reinforce the role of the Commission's 
audio-visual library and audio-visual portal. The services should also encourage 
audiovisual media professionals to create and take part in European audiovisual 
networks which would bring together resources to create and broadcast EU-
content, while retaining full editorial independence. By supporting co-operation 
and exchange between broadcasters and offering audio-visual material on major 
EU events free-of-charge, the Commission was convinced it would be able to 
bridge this gap. Somewhat later, Margot Wallström (2008) in a talk entitled 
"Communicating Europe - Mission impossible?" was very clear: 
"Communication is a tool for democracy. In democratic societies, citizens 
need to know what the decision makers actually do and they must have 
the means to scrutinize them. The right to vote is clearly cornerstone to 
democracy, but the right to know should be just as important." 
Wallstrom laid out the main issues regarding some of the biggest challenges for 
Europe. Even as she espoused the importance of democracy, transparency and 
openness, for instance, she challenged her colleagues to think about how to 
communicate all this efficiently: 
"Do we have an information deficit? I do not think so. There is plenty of 
information on the EU and how it works. (...) Communication does not 
happen in an isolated vacuum, but in the public sphere. It is the public 
sphere of 27 Member States and of 23 languages. And to make it even 
more complicated: it is the public sphere of 3660 TV channels in Europe, 
of 25,000 journalists and 480 million citizens. (...) I think that there is a 
successful way to communicate Europe. It is not a "mission impossible", 
but a challenge and a task not to be solved via a simple Brussels directive. 
For me it is 'mission irresistible' – and a never-ending task." 
In his paper "European Public Spheres and the EU's Communication Strategy: 
From Deficits to Policy Fit?" Markus Thiel (2008) spoke about his analysis of the 
communication and information deficits between the Union's institutions, the 
national governments, and the mass media. He made several suggestions as to 
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how the Union might improve its communication policy. "The Union is well 
advised in localizing news coming out of Brussels in the already existing and 
popularly used national media channels. Unfortunately, the efforts of 
Commissioner Wallström do not indicate that important mass media outlets are 
considered necessary by the Union." 
Against this background, Thiel proposed supporting public television as a means 
to forward these goals. If the European Public TV, since the TSF Directive 
(1989), had not served to promote the identity / diversity of the great European 
house, the European cultural heritage, and the idea of Europe, what role did a 
European public service television fulfil? Speaking on the subject "Putting Europe 
in the Picture", Schwarz argued that programmes dedicated to EU affairs alone 
were not effective: the European dimension had to be integrated into thematic 
programmes and domestic news (A. Schwarz, RFI). However, what was truly 
incredible was the lack of a clear commitment on the part of public European 
broadcasters to put Europe in their picture. How might Europe, after so many 
years, sacrifice the implementation of its communication strategy, its main 
forum, the fundamental network of public radio and television broadcasters? 
European Parliament resolutions and the principles laid down in the Green Paper 
on Audiovisual (1984) and the Audiovisual Directive have set up the European 
system of public television as a strategic platform for the assimilation of the 
European project and the idea of Europe. The main issue, however, is that the 
Brussels bureaucrats have never conceded this fact. The strategic goal of the 
Audiovisual Directive was clear. In order to reverse the predominance of North 
American television shows and films on European screens, Europe needed: (i) 
freedom of movement of European television programmes in the internal 
market, and (ii) broadcasting quotas that would require European operators to 
allocate more than half of their broadcasting time to European content. 
As we have pointed out previously (Cádima, 2007: 11-12), European audiovisual 
policy, as regards public audiovisuals, and in order to follow key principles of the 
Directive, should be based on the primacy of culture over market forces and on 
European cultural heritage and diversity as a fundamental cultural strategy for 
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the consolidation of the idea of Europe, in particular through the widespread and 
consistent dissemination of the European audiovisual sector in the Member 
States. However, the European Parliament itself has found the opposite to be 
true: '(...) the share of European works is mostly filled by national works'. No 
assertive monitoring of European operators' adherence to the TVSF Directive has 
been undertaken, as was explicitly stated in the European Commission's own 
assessments of the application of Articles 4 and 5 of the Directive (PE 2004).7
The European Parliament has more recently taken up the topic again. A report 
from the European Parliament of 2013, about the implementation of the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (PE 2013)
 
Nevertheless, no substantive changes have yet been put into practice. 
8
As has been pointed out previously, this question is fundamental and has been 
brought up by multiple European researchers and / or parliamentarians over 
recent decades: Batz, Barzanti, Garcia, Cádima, Thiel, Janssen, and others. 
Thus, it is hard to accept that, on the one hand, the Commission has abandoned 
assessments
, regarding the promotion of 
European audiovisual content, called attention to the following (paragraph 31): 
"(...) while the majority of Member States respect the rules on the promotion of 
European works, priority is still given to national works, and the percentage of 
independent works broadcast on television is declining. "In paragraph 33 of the 
same document, the European Parliament also requested that "the obligation to 
provide information on European works must include at least a breakdown by 
category (cinematographic works, television productions of fiction and non-
fiction, shows and entertainment programs) and means of distribution and calls 
on Member States to provide relevant data on this subject." 
9
                                                          
7 European Parliament resolution on the application of Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 89/552 / EEC 
 and, on the hand, that the European Parliament has apparently 
"Television without Frontiers", as amended by Directive 97/36 / EC, for the 2001-2002 period 
[2004/2236 (INI)]. 
8 Report on the implementation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (2013) (2012/2132 
(INI)), Committee on Culture and Education, 2013.(2012/2132(INI)), da Comissão da Cultura e da 
Educação, 2013. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-
0055+0+DOC+PDF+V0//PT 
9 See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/information_society/avpolicy/reg/tvwf/implementation/reports/index
_en.htm 
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dropped the issue of European production quotas in its monitoring of the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive. The EU's own communication strategy is 
now subsumed under the "European Single Market Strategy". The position 
closest to the original concept is the action plan on misinformation within the 
strategic communication working group for the East (East StratCom ), a EU and 
NATO initiative dealing with strategic communication in crisis situations and the 
"reaction" to cybercrises. There is, as well, a social media network campaign 
about the European Citizens' Initiative10. What is more, the EU Strategic 
Communication Plan (2016-2020)11
Meanwhile, a new revision of the Audiovisual Directive was launched in 2015
, while recognizing that "communication does 
not take place in a vacuum, but in a complex environment of 28 national public 
spaces and an emerging European Public Space" (page 4), fails not only not 
mention the PSM (Public Service Media) of the Member States as it equally 
ignores the traditional public television service in Europe. 
12
                                                          
10 A UE em 2018 — Relatório Geral sobre a Atividade da União Europeia. (2019). Comissão 
Europeia. Direção-Geral da Comunicação. http://europa.eu/general-report/pt 
 
aimed at updating the existing rules for the provision of audiovisual media 
services in Europe. In so far as the promotion of production is concerned, the 
new document required on-demand service providers (such as Netflix) to 
promote the production and distribution of European works, stating that at least 
30% of their catalogues would have to be made up of European content. Articles 
16 and 17 of the 2010 Directive requiring "television broadcasters to reserve a 
majority proportion of their broadcasting time" were maintained. However, the 
Commission also insisted on doing away with key requirements that such works 
are from third States, and not from national programming in each Member 
State. National content thus counts statistically as the production / distribution 
of European content, leaving national broadcasting operators and their 
audiences to focus in on their own national production, which is basically 
television broadcasting, or in other words "teletrash" to a large extent. The EU 
thus continues its solitary path, outside the potential of its Public Service Media 
11 Strategic Plan 2016 – 2020. DG Communication. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/strategic-plan-2016-2020-dg-comm_april2016_en.pdf 
12 EU DIRECTIVE (EU) 2018/1808 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 14 
November 2018 that amended Directive 2010/13/UE. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/PT/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018L1808&from=EN 
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system, giving credence to the critics of this model, who, thirty years after the 
first audiovisual directive (1989) continue to think basically like Garcia (2007: 
2): "There exists a profound anachronism between the EU's chimerical vision of 
television as a unifying force and what actually takes place in the audiovisual 
market". 
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